Olivier Cassagnau

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vendredi 30 novembre 2018

Informations les plus urgentes

A l'attention des étudiants de L3 LEA (et, éventuellement, de L3 LLCE/Info-Com): la totalité du contenu du programme de Civilisation britannique est disponible ci-dessous.

Eléments de cours "Britain in Europe" + documents en annexe (L3 LEA et Master 2 SGAT)

Part 1: Britain and Europe until 1800

The beginnings, Ancient Britain: The British Isles were peopled by so-called « Iberians », Homo sapiens who had replaced Neanderthals as early as the late Paleolithic (about 50,000 years ago). These people, who already looked like today Europeans, had the same genetic traits as other Western Europeans, especially on the Atlantic coasts. (Those genetic specificities have been best preserved among Basque people till today). Those native Europeans underwent progressive Indo-European invasions – which started in Central Europe probably five thousand years ago – and they gradually adopted Celtic culture from 800 BC onwards. Then the British Isles were controlled by the Roman Empire AD 43-410.

Afterwards, waves of Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian invaders practically until the year 1000 forced the Celts to go west. Some of those Celts (who spoke Brythonic languages) fled to Armorica between the 5th and the 7th centuries A.D. and Armorica became Brittany. The various waves of Germanic invaders converted progressively from paganism to Christianity and, as Christians, took part in the political, economic and religious life of Europe. In particular, there was a lot of trade going on with the Continent and many Anglo-Saxon pilgrims travelled to Rome.

Medieval Britain: The arrival of the Normans in 1066 entailed great changes for the social structure of the British Isles but also great changes for the English language, which incorporated a growing number of words of Romance origin.

England’s fate became intertwined with that of Continental European monarchies, especially the French monarchy. Indeed, very soon, the Anglo-Norman aristocracy became entangled in quarrels on the Continent through the practice of intermarriage.

The Hundred Years’ War and the Renaissance: The Hundred Years’ War took place from 1337 to 1453 between two royal houses for the French throne, the House of Valois and the House of Plantagenet (/plæn’tædʒɨnɨt/), also known as the House of Anjou. The end of the Hundred Years’ War meant that England somehow stopped thinking of itself as a Continental European actor and started focusing on its maritime power.

The Anglican Reformation under Henry VIII and England’s alliance with other Protestant powers meant that he rejected Charles V (Charles Quint) and his imperial vision.

Long-lasting isolationism: England (and, from 1707 onwards, the United Kingdom) considered Europe mainly as a source of problems. In particular, English Protestants feared Catholic plots orchestrated by France and Spain to overthrow the monarchy. Until 1713 the Spanish Netherlands were dangerously close to English coasts.

Part 2: 1800-1951

The fear of the extension of the French Revolution and the war against Napoleon’s Empire (between 1803 and 1815) further isolated Britain from Continental Europe. The Continental System set up by Napoleon was meant to prevent trade with the United Kingdom but it was only partially successful. The fact that Napoleon wanted to appear as Charlemagne’s successor one thousand years afterwards also persuaded the British that ideas of European unity were definitely dangerous.

The XIXth century was also a time of European disunity because of the rise of nationalism practically everywhere in Europe (resulting in the formation of true nation-states, especially after 1848) and because European countries competed – especially in Africa – to conquer colonies in the second half of the century. The ironical thing is that the Holy Roman Empire crumbled essentially because of Napoleon’s wars which paved the way for the unification of Italy and Germany in the 1860s and in the 1870s.

Britain was very concerned with the balance of powers because it was afraid of empires so it started forming alliances with weaker countries against emerging superpowers. The British government had a very pragmatic approach in terms of alliances: It fought against the Russian Empire alongside the French, the Ottomans and the Sardinians between 1853 and 1856 during the Crimean War but formed the Triple Entente with France and Russia in 1907 against Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. During the XIXth century, Britain tried to make sure that neither the Germans, the Russians nor the Ottomans would become too powerful in Europe and create a major confrontation.

The British were particularly worried because those three empires were based on authoritarian principles at a time when the British democratic system was consolidating itself. In particular, the Russians and the Ottomans were usually very tough on the populations which revolted against their rules. For example, Britons were shocked by the savagery of Ottoman Başıbozuklar (irregular soldiers) when they repressed an uprising in Bulgaria in April 1876.

Overseas it was a different matter, of course, since the British also ruled their colonies (including Ireland) with an iron hand. For example, in India, the reaction to the sepoy mutiny of 1857 may have caused hundreds of thousands of deaths.

The UK relied heavily on its colonies and did not believe in the ideal of European integration which developed on the Continent during the 20th century, for example among some supporters of the League of Nations in 1919 who also believed in European federalism. The terrible human cost of the First World War for Britain (nearly one million casualties) and of the Second World War (nearly half a million people, including over 60,000 civilians) made British public opinion think once more that Continental Europe was a dangerous place and that it was definitely better to stay away from any project of political unification. In particular, the fact that the Nazis had managed to gain support from collaborators outside Germany during the Occupation caused many Britons to think that Continental Europeans were not very reliable when it came to defend freedom and that pro-European ideas were spread essentially by people supporting German supremacy.

Now let us take a look at Europe in 1945 : Huge war destructions had been committed, commodities were still rationed and there was a need to rebuild many parts of Western Europe. Politicians did not want to make the same mistakes as after the First World War: Winston Churchill did not want Germany to be humiliated the way it had been after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 because he knew German people may become communists. In September 1946 in Zurich he had mentioned ‘the United States of Europe’ but he did not think that Britain’s interest was to be part of them.

The West German Republic (created in 1949) was still occupied by the Americans, the British and the French, but that was meant to protect it from a Soviet invasion. The US needed West Germany for its own security and also to promote the American capitalistic system in Europe with the Marshall Plan in 1947-1951. So the Americans needed a united Western Europe for defence and economic reasons. To begin with, they created the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949.

Part 3: 1951-1952

Some European politicians strongly believed that without any kind of Franco-German reconciliation, there would be a new war between the two countries. They thought that a united (preferably federal) Europe would prevent that.

(About federalism, Professor Andrew Geddes once wrote: "In federal systems, such as the USA and Germany, neither the central nor the regional level of government is supposed to be subordinate to the other. Federalism is seen as generating effective central power for handling common problems whilst preserving regional autonomy. Five main features of a federal system of government can be highlighted: two levels of government, a general and a regional/ formal distribution of legislative and executive authority and sources of revenue between the two levels/ a written constitution/ a supreme or constitutional court to adjudicate in disputes between the two levels/ central institutions, including a bicameral legislature within which the upper chamber will usually embody territorial representation, as is the case with the US Senate and the German Bundesrat." Andrew GEDDES, The European Union and British Politics, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2004, p.43. Other sources in French include books by Professor Maurice Croisat).

So they decided to help Western Europeans set up two projects:

First, it was the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. By mixing coal and steel resources, Western European countries were supposed to rebuild themselves and protect their industries in France, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Italy. Those places were known as a kind of ‘fertile crescent’: especially the Ruhr region in Germany, Lorraine in France and Borinage in Belgium. The project mixed economic survival with the use of a modern, fashionable subject like sustainable development today.

The British were not interested in joining the ECSC because their industry was strong enough (especially considering that they had a large market in their former colonial Empire) and also because they already suspected that there was a project of political integration behind this.

This assumption was reinforced by the fact that the Rhine region, alongside Northern Italy, was a Christian-Democratic stronghold (with big Social-Democratic pockets where workers lived) and the British knew perfectly well that those people supported European federalism, especially since Rhineland had been the centre of Charlemagne’s empire. Indeed, while Christian-Democrats are overwhelmingly Catholic, the UK has always had a more Protestant approach to European politics and the transatlantic relationship, which has always made negotiations with Continental European Christian-Democrats awkward even when the British government was Conservative. While Protestants have traditionally linked their faith with the existence of a nation-state, Catholics have usually had a more complex approach to national identity, sharing their loyalty between an empire on the one hand (such as the Carolingian Empire, the Holy Roman Empire and, later, the Austro-Hungarian Empire) and the Pope in Rome on the other hand. In stark contrast with Continental European habits, Britain's conception of Europe was that of stable nations competing with one another and forming strategic alliances rather than achieving political unification. It had not been politically influenced by Charlemagne’s legacy in the IXth century and it had not experienced the quarrel between the Guelphs (the supporters of the Popes) and the Ghibellines (the supporters of the Holy Roman Empire) between the XIth and the XVth centuries.

The second project was the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1952. The USA did not want to ensure the security of Western Europe alone, they needed the French and the West Germans to create a European federal army with governmental structures to make it efficient. All six countries in the ECSC were supposed to form the EDC as well. However, the EDC project was derailed essentially by the Communists and the Gaullists at the French National Assembly in 1954. The Communists could not possibly approve of the creation of an army directed against the Soviet Union and the Gaullists deeply resented the fact that France would be deprived of a large part of its military sovereignty. Moreover, both parties thought the EDC served the interests of the Americans too much.

In this respect, it is quite ironical to notice that, to compensate for the failure of the EDC, the Bundeswehr was created in 1955 under the direct influence of NATO. This was not the only setback for the French Communists and Gaullists since the new army also had an open commitment to European integration. However, the Gaullists were satisfied to see the independence of France had been preserved and they considered that this preservation justified the sacrifice of Franco-German integration. In reaction to the creation of the Bundeswehr, the Soviets created the National People's Army in the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

Part 4: The reaction after 1952 until the real turning point of 1957

Because of the failure of the EDC project, Europhiles decided that it was probably better to care for political and strategic integration later, once economic integration had been achieved. This is when many of them started realising that it was probably more effective to act fairly secretely, for example by promoting only economic integration while actually working for political integration. Also, they said they promoted co-operation between sovereign countries while they knew full well that, beyond a certain point, it is difficult for tight co-operation not to turn into integration.

What people like Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman wanted to create was de facto solidarities (“solidarités de fait”) which would later be legitimised by laws, especially European directives. This is what is called “functionalism” (and, later, “neofunctionalism”): states become integrated from an economic and technical point of view, then integration also becomes political as it reaches new domains through what is called “spillover”, the fact that the new European political élite progressively invests new sectors of political action.

After having created a common market for coal and steel, Europhiles decided to take it up to the next level with trade and services. This was decided on at the Messina Conference in 1955 and then inscribed in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The European Economic Community (EEC) was created that year, in 1957. It was also called the Common Market.

The revolutionary aspect of the Common Market was not just about suppressing tariffs but also about ensuring the free circulation of goods, services and people barely twelve years after the end of the Second World War and in the midst of the Cold War.

From 1958 onwards, French President Charles de Gaulle worked to put the Franco-German axis at the centre of the EEC, taking advantage of his good relationships with West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, a Christian-Democrat from Cologne. Franco-German reconciliation became official with the signing of the Elysée Treaty in 1963.

It is to be noted that the European Economic Community – which became the European Union (EU) in 1993 – was not simply an economic and commercial organisation since its architecture was based on a reinforced version of three institutions which had been created at the time of the ECSC in 1951: an executive body (The European Commission), a parliamentary body (The European Parliament, which had got only a consultative role when it was created but which was supposed to become a true Parliament little by little right from the start) and a judicial body (The Court of Justice of the European Communities).

That shows that the ‘founding fathers’ of the ECSC already had a political Europe in mind, particularly since they saw the Court of Justice as a future kind of Supreme Court which could force member states to enforce decisions made at the European level.

From the start, the EEC represented a compromise between those who favoured supranationalism (that is to say a federal Europe) and those who preferred intergovernmentalism: some domains allowed the use of qualified majority voting while others demanded unanimity. This constituted in itself the promise of future clashes between pro-Europeans and Eurosceptics.

To try and prevent conflicts, a structure in pillars was eventually set up in 1993, when the EEC became the European Union (EU) under the terms of the Treaty of Maastricht signed in February 1992: the first pillar was for matters decided on by Community institutions and the other two (“Common Foreign and Security Policy” and “Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters”) relied upon the intergovernmental co-operation method.

However, this structure in pillars was given up in December 2009, when the Treaty of Lisbon came into force. The fact that the EU now has got a legal personality and a less clear distribution of competences seems dangerous to some British Eurosceptics, who are also alarmed at the fact that the Treaty of Lisbon re-asserts the priority given to European law and to the Court of Justice (now called “Court of Justice of the European Union”) over state legislations.

So even though the opposition between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism may have been perfectly valid in the fifties and sixties, it has become largely debatable considering the hybrid character of the European Union. Today the distinction between ‘soft power’ and ‘hard power’ seems more acceptable, considering that the European Union is a system in which a considerable number of autonomous, yet intermingled actors can exert influence on the decisions which are taken, especially since the division into pillars has disappeared.

Part 5: The long road towards Britain’s accession to the EEC

At the end of the fifties and at the beginning of the sixties, the Conservatives – who were in power – were more enthusiastic than Labour politicians about joining the Common Market. While Conservative politicians under Prime Minister Harold Macmillan (1957-1963) were enticed by what they perceived as being a way of promoting free trade and capitalism in Europe, Labour politicians were put off by the fact that joining the EEC would have meant giving up favourable commercial ties with Commonwealth countries.

Indeed, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) meant that British consumers would have to pay more for European – especially French – products because their prices were guaranteed. So many Labourites thought that the European Community was “a rich man’s club”, something dangerous for the working classes.

However, when Harold Wilson came to power in October 1964, he chose not to oppose Britain’s possible future membership of the EEC, partly because he and some other Labour politicians were not against it and partly because he realised that Europeanisation was inevitable from an economic and technical point of view.

Nevertheless, Charles de Gaulle refused to let the United Kingdom enter the EEC twice, in 1963 and in 1967, because he feared it would act as a ‘Trojan horse’ of the United States. That meant that he thought that the British government would do everything it could to use the EEC in order to serve American interests. De Gaulle favoured France’s military independence and a Franco-German alliance over the tight military cooperation which the UK practised with the USA.

De Gaulle also resorted to what was called “the empty chair policy” (“la politique de la chaise vide”) in 1965-66 in order to prevent the extension of the principle of majority voting to fields formerly ruled by the principle of unanimity. To do that he made sure that France was not represented in meetings of the Council of Ministers of the EEC, effectively blocking all decisions. De Gaulle finally resigned in April 1969 after having lost a referendum on regionalisation.

Fortunately for the British, his successor – Georges Pompidou, who was President between 1969 and 1974 – was better disposed towards them and he was greatly helped by the personality of Wilson’s Conservative successor, Edward Heath (1970-1974), who was a staunch pro-European and generally got along well with Christian-Democrats and Social-Democrats. Although Pompidou was still a Gaullist who preferred intergovernmentalism and not a true Christian-Democratic federalist, he wanted European integration to make progress again and he organised a summit of the Six in The Hague in December 1969. This meeting has often been compared with the Messina Conference of 1955 and it enabled Pompidou to present his vision of “completion, deepening and enlargement” (“achèvement, approfondissement et élargissement”) as far as his European policy was concerned.

In 1972 Pompidou organised a referendum and the French approved the United Kingdom’s admission into the EEC (alongside The Republic of Ireland and Denmark), which became effective on January 1st, 1973.

When Harold Wilson came back to power in 1974, he said he wanted British people to confirm their attachment to the EEC and he organised a referendum in June 1975. Two thirds of voters supported the "Yes" alongside most Labour, Conservative and Liberal politicians. At that time, it was considered that British public opinion was rather pro-European because the Common Market meant economic development without significant losses of sovereignty, but that changed with Margaret Thatcher’s ascension to the post of Leader of the Conservative Party in 1975 (even though she supported the "Yes" during the referendum), then to that of Prime Minister in 1979.

Indeed, Margaret Thatcher became less and less pro-European as European integration became more and more political: In 1975, in order to relaunch European integration from an intergovernmental perspective, European leaders (in particular Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, who was then the Christian-Democratic President of France and Helmut Schmidt, the Social-Democratic West German Chancellor) created the European Council - which gathered the heads of state and government - and which did not become an official EU institution before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009. The European Commission criticised the creation of such an intergovernmental institution but was too weak to be able to oppose it.

In compensation for the creation of the European Council, European leaders decided that the European Parliament would gradually acquire new powers and be elected directly by citizens every five years. The first election took place in 1979 and the first President of the Parliament was Simone Veil, a respected centre-right political figure who had presented the bill legalising abortion at the French National Assembly in 1974. The fact that she was elected President of the European Parliament was a very strong political symbol of Franco-German reconciliation since she had been deported to Auschwitz in 1944.

The political situation in the 1980s did nothing to reassure Thatcher: The Giscard d'Estaing-Schmidt partnership was replaced by a new alliance between François Mitterrand (a Social-Democrat) and Helmut Kohl (a Christian-Democrat) whose relationship culminated in a historical meeting on the battlefield of Verdun in 1984, the two men being photographed hand in hand. Moreover, the European Commission became influential again at that time thanks to the personality of its new President, a Social-Democratic federalist named Jacques Delors, who served three terms: 1985-1988, 1989-1992 and 1993-1994. The British Conservative Party became increasingly divided on the issue of European integration, with European Commissioners such as Arthur Cockfield (1985-1988) and Leon Brittan (1989-1999) supporting the development of a fully-integrated European internal market while Eurosceptics were much less enthusiastic about single European norms.

Part 6: The acceleration of European integration in the 1980s and 1990s and new perspectives

In 1986, pro-European Conservatives persuaded Margaret Thatcher to sign the Single European Act (SEA), which transformed the Common Market into a Single Market. Yet she did not approve of other, more political elements favoured by European leaders of the time, in particular the Schengen Agreement, signed in 1985 and completed by a very important protocol in 1990 about the lifting of border controls, which created a free-circulation area within the EEC and then the EU.

She was also hostile towards the transformation of the virtual European Currency Unit (ECU) into a single currency but lost power in November 1990, too early to reject the Treaty of Maastricht, which was negociated in December 1991 and signed in February 1992 and which introduced the principle of that single currency.

Thatcher’s successor, John Major (who was also a Conservative and who was Prime Minister from 1990 to 1997) did not want to appear as hostile towards Europe as Thatcher had sometimes appeared so he did not oppose the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht by Britain. Instead, he made sure the principle of qualified majority voting was not extended to other fields and that some opt-out measures were guaranteed for Britain: the country did not have to sign the Social Chapter or to adopt the single currency.

John Major also wanted to be sure that foreign and defence policy would remain a prerogative of the member states and not of the Community, especially since he wanted to prevent the emergence of an autonomous European defence outside the frame of NATO. In 1994, his opposition to European federalism made him oppose the appointment of Jean-Luc Dehaene (the Belgian Prime Minister) as President of the European Commission to succeed Jacques Delors. Instead, Jacques Santer (the Prime Minister of Luxemburg) was chosen even though he was also a federalist.

In December 1995 it was decided that the single currency would be called the euro. John Major had always thought that the adoption of the single currency by the UK should be performed under strict economic conditions only and Tony Blair, his Labourite successor from 1997 to 2007, kept the same position. Although Blair declared that he was a pro-European, he led almost the same European policies as John Major, turning those strict economic conditions into an excuse for not joining the Eurozone.

After the introduction of banknotes and coins in euros in 2002, European integration experienced a new dynamic phase. In 2004, the Convention on the Future of Europe (a body composed of politicians and experts) put forward the "Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe".

However, the European Constitution never entered into force because it neeeded unanimous approval and was rejected by French and Dutch voters in referenda in 2005. So a new Treaty was drafted: it was the Treaty of Lisbon, which did not replace the Treaty of Rome (now called the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) and the Treaty of Maastricht (now called the Treaty on the European Union) but reorganised them. Entering into effect in December 2009, it provided the EU with legal personality (the power to sign international treaties in its own name), gave new powers to the European Parliament and greatly extended the use of Qualified Majority Voting, which made British Eurosceptics criticise Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown (in charge between 2007 and 2010) very harshly for having asked Parliament to ratify it.

After the fall of communism in 1989, the USA realised that the EEC had become an economic rival instead of a mere protégé. Now, with the creation of a strong euro (especially in the decade spanning between 2002 and 2012) and the phenomenon of industrial concentration within the EU, America’s predominance appears to be somewhat challenged, and this proves to be a strong dilemma for the United Kingdom which has always tried to be a bridge between Europe and America, particularly when Tony Blair was Prime Minister.

Moreover, the fall of the Iron Curtain has not had consequences in the economic field only, but also in the diplomatic and military fields since it has encouraged governments and institutions to take charge in a free Europe. For example, it comes as no surprise that the multinational army corps called Eurocorps was created in 1992 and that its nucleus should be the Franco-German brigade established in 1987. Although it was not directly created by the EU it enjoys a positive reputation among European institutions and Europhiles.

The UK had no intention of joining it and it also opposed the transformation of the European Union Military Staff (the EUMS, which has only two hundred people working for it) into true military headquarters capable of organising large operations because it was afraid of any structure which could be in competition with NATO. Instead, it favoured bilateral co-operation like the Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty signed with France in November 2010 without much regard for European integration or the future of the European defense industry.

At the beginning of the 2010s, this led to growing mistrust for the European Union among many British people, especially older ones, who thought that they had been deceived in 1973 when they were promised that they would be part of a predominantly economic Europe and not a political one. While many Continental Europeans blamed the EU for being too favourable to deregulation and economic austerity, this was not a problem in the United Kingdom. On the contrary, many British Conservatives and supporters of UKIP (The United Kingdom and Independence Party, a very Eurosceptical party) thought the EU was not going far enough and was in fact preventing the UK from implementing reforms which were supposed to deregulate the economy even more.

In May 2010, the Conservative Party won a general election but it failed to obtain an absolute majority, therefore producing the first hung parliament since 1974 and the first to last more than a few months since 1929. Consequently, its leader – David Cameron – had to form a coalition with Nick Clegg’s Liberal-Democrats. Although relationships between the two men were very good, Cameron planned to win the next general election on his own and tried to attract Eurosceptical voters by claiming in January 2013 that he wanted to renegotiate the United Kingdom’s terms of membership to the European Union. Cameron did more or less what Harold Wilson had done in the 1974 Labour Party Manifesto by promising to organise a referendum the next year if he won the general election. Wanting to win the 2015 general election, Cameron promised a referendum for the spring of 2016.

David Cameron thought that British voters would choose to keep the UK in the EU. On the 18th of September 2014, he was reassured to see that 55% of Scottish voters had chosen to keep Scotland in the UK during the Scottish independence referendum which was held that day. He was quite confident that the referendum on British membership to the EU would deliver a similar result.

The following year, in May 2015, the general election ended in a surprise victory for the Conservative Party, which no longer needed the Liberal-Democratic party to govern. Now in a position of strength, David Cameron thought that British voters would choose to keep the UK in the EU during the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum, held on June 23rd 2016, especially since most parties apart from UKIP supported continued membership. Initial results were good for the government but it appeared that some regions which were expected to vote “Remain” were in fact voting “Leave”. At the end of the night, the “Leave” camp had won by 52% to 48%. England and Wales voted to leave and Scotland and Northern Ireland to remain, which started creating tensions rapidly.

In July, David Cameron resigned and the Conservative Party chose Theresa May to replace him. She was in a difficult position, having supported the “Remain” camp, but she promised she would take the UK out of the EU. She started doing so by triggering Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union in March 2017, which means that the UK is supposed to have left the EU by the end of March 2019.

In April 2017, Theresa May organised a general election but the Conservative Party lost thirteen seats and this resulted in a hung parliament again, at the worst time on top of that since negotiations with European institutions were starting to get really difficult. The Conservative majority in the House of Commons was preserved thanks to an alliance with the Democratic Unionist Party, a right-wing party composed of Eurosceptical Ulster Protestants. This made things even more complicated for the government since most people in Northern Ireland – including many Protestants – absolutely refuse the return of a hard border between the two parts of Ireland.

The future of the United Kingdom’s relationships with the European Union depends on a clear choice the country has to make: either it remains in the Single Market and allows EU citizens to continue settling down freely within its borders or it decides to limit the free circulation of those EU citizens on its soil and therefore has to leave the Single Market as well.

vendredi 1 septembre 2017

Textes pouvant intéresser les étudiants du Master Sécurité globale

Chers étudiants,

Voici des textes de politique britannique qui étaient autrefois au programme et qui peuvent vous permettre de parfaire vos connaissances générales.

lundi 18 janvier 2016

TD de Civi GB L1 et L2 LLCE

A l'attention des étudiants de L2: voici le premier texte à étudier.

"1945 Labour Party Election Manifesto Let Us Face the Future: A Declaration of Labour Policy for the Consideration of the Nation. Victory in War must be followed by a Prosperous Peace Victory is assured for us and our allies in the European war. The war in the East goes the same way. The British Labour Party is firmly resolved that Japanese barbarism shall be defeated just as decisively as Nazi aggression and tyranny. The people will have won both struggles. The gallant men and women in the Fighting Services, in the Merchant Navy, Home Guard and Civil Defence, in the factories and in the bombed areas - they deserve and must be assured a happier future than faced so many of them after the last war. Labour regards their welfare as a sacred trust. In the years that followed, the "hard-faced men" and their political friends kept control of the Government. They controlled the banks, the mines, the big industries, largely the press and the cinema. They controlled the means by which the people got their living. They controlled the ways by which most of the people learned about the world outside. This happened in all the big industrialised countries. Great economic blizzards swept the world after the last war. The great inter-war slumps were not acts of God or of blind forces. They were the sure and certain result of the concentration of too much economic power in the hands of too few men. These men had only learned how to act in the interest of their own bureaucratically-run private monopolies which may be likened to totalitarian oligarchies within our democratic State. They had and they felt no responsibility to the nation. Similar forces are at work today. The interests have not been able to make the same profits out of this war as they did out of the last. The determined propaganda of the Labour Party, helped by other progressive forces, had its effect in "taking the profit out of war". The 100% Excess Profits Tax, the controls over industry and transport, the fair rationing of food and control of prices - without which the Labour Party would not have remained in the Government - these all helped to win the war. With these measures the country has come nearer to making "fair shares" the national rule than ever before in its history. The Labour Party stands for freedom - for freedom of worship, freedom of speech, freedom of the Press. The Labour Party will see to it that we keep and enlarge these freedoms, and that we enjoy again the personal civil liberties we have, of our own free will, sacrificed to win the war. The freedom of the Trade Unions, denied by the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1927, must also be restored. But there are certain so-called freedoms that Labour will not tolerate: freedom to exploit other people; freedom to pay poor wages and to push up prices for selfish profit; freedom to deprive the people of the means of living full, happy, healthy lives. Labour will raise the school leaving age to 16 at the earliest possible moment, "further" or adult education, and free secondary education for all. And, above all, let us remember that the great purpose of education is to give us individual citizens capable of thinking for themselves. National and local authorities should co-operate to enable people to enjoy their leisure to the full, to have opportunities for healthy recreation. By the provision of concert halls, modern libraries, theatres and suitable civic centres, we desire to assure to our people full access to the great heritage of culture in this nation. By good food and good homes, much avoidable ill-health can be prevented. In addition the best health services should be available free for all. Money must no longer be the passport to the best treatment. In the new National Health Service there should be health centres where the people may get the best that modern science can offer, more and better hospitals, and proper conditions for our doctors and nurses. More research is required into the causes of disease and the ways to prevent and cure it. Labour will work specially for the care of Britain's mothers and their children - children's allowances and school medical and feeding services, better maternity and child welfare services. A healthy family life must be fully ensured and parenthood must not be penalised if the population of Britain is to be prevented from dwindling."

Et voici le deuxième texte:

"1964 Labour Party Election Manifesto, "The New Britain" The world wants it and would welcome it. The British people want it, deserve it and urgently need it. And now, at last, the general election presents us with the exciting prospect of achieving it. The dying months of a frustrating 1964 can be transformed into the launching platform for the New Britain of the late 1960s and early 1970s. A New Britain - mobilising the resources of technology under a national plan; harnessing our national wealth in brains, our genius for scientific invention and medical discovery; reversing the decline of the thirteen wasted years; affording a new opportunity to equal, and if possible surpass, the roaring progress of other western powers while Tory Britain has moved sideways, backwards but seldom forward. The country needs fresh and virile leadership. Labour is ready. Poised to swing its plans into instant operation. Impatient to apply the "new thinking" that will end the chaos and sterility. Here is Labour's Manifesto for the 1964 election, restless with positive remedies for the problems the Tories have criminally neglected. Here is the case for planning, and the details of how a Labour Cabinet will formulate the national economic plan with both sides of industry operating in partnership with the Government. And here, in this manifesto, is the answer to the Tory gibe that planning could involve a loss of individual liberty. Labour has resolved to humanise the whole administration of the state and to set up the new office of Parliamentary Commissioner with the right and duty to investigate and expose any misuse of government power as it affects the citizen. Much of the manifesto deals with the vital social services that affect the personal lives and happiness of us all, the welfare of our families and the immediate future of our children : The imperative need for a revolution in our education system which will ensure the education of all our citizens in the responsibilities of this scientific age; the soaring prices in houses, flats and land; social security benefits which have fallen below the minimum levels of human need; the burden of prescription charges in the Health Service. Labour is concerned, too, with the problems of leisure in the age of automation and here again Labour firmly puts the freedom of the individual first. "It is not the job of the Government to tell people how leisure should be used", the manifesto declares. But, in a society where facilities are not provided when they are not profitable and where the trend towards monopoly is growing, it is the job of the Government to ensure that leisure facilities are provided and that a reasonable range of choice is maintained. The Tories still peddle their boast - "You've never had it so good." The truth is that Britain could and should have had it a whole lot better, and in the process have shown a greater concern for the needs of others. Second, it has necessitated a stop-go economic policy, resulting in intermittent bouts of high unemployment. A continuing excess of imports over exports, with consequential balance of payments and currency crises has forced the Government again and again to halt expansion and to squeeze and freeze the economy. Third, it has led to growing stagnation, unemployment and under employment in large parts of the North, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, combined with a drift of work and people to the overcrowded London and Midland regions. It has also led to a pervasive atmosphere of irresponsibility; to a selfish, get-rich-quick mood, in which the public interest is always subordinated to private advantage."

Puis le troisième:

Speech by Edward Heath (Brussels, 22 January 1972)

« We mark today, with this ceremony, the conclusion of arduous negotiations over more than ten years which have resulted in another great step forward towards the removal of divisions in Western Europe. This uniting of friendly States within the framework of a single community has been brought about by the sustained and dedicated work of many people. Their efforts were essential to the success which we are celebrating. My tribute here is to all who have laboured in this great enterprise — not only to those who have negotiated, Ministers and officials, together with the members of the Commission who have contributed so much, but to all who, in their many different ways, have supported and advanced the idea of a united Europe. Just as the achievement we celebrate today was not preordained, so there will be nothing inevitable about the next stages in the construction of Europe. They will require clear thinking and a strong effort of the imagination. Clear thinking will be needed to recognise that each of us within the Community will remain proudly attached to our national identity and to the achievements of our national history and tradition. But, at the same time, as the enlargement of the Community makes clear beyond doubt, we have all come to recognize our common European heritage, our mutual interests and our European destiny. Imagination will be required to develop institutions which respect the traditions and the individuality of the Member States, but at the same time have the strength to guide the future course of the enlarged Community. The founders of the Community displayed great originality in devising the institutions of the Six. They have been proved in the remarkable achievements of the Community over the years. It is too early to say how far they will meet the needs of the enlarged Community. For we are faced with an essentially new situation, though one which was always inherent in the foundation of the Community of the Six, which was visualized in the preamble to the Treaty of Rome and which has been created by its success. Let us not be afraid to contemplate new measures to deal with the new situation. There is another cause for satisfaction. “Europe” is more than Western Europe alone. There lies also to the east another part of our continent: countries whose history has been closely linked with our own. Beyond those countries is the Soviet Union, a European as well as an Asian power. We in Britain have every reason to wish for better relations with the states of Eastern Europe. And we do sincerely want them. Our new partners on the continent have shown that their feelings are the same. Henceforth our efforts can be united. The European Communities, far from creating barriers, have served to extend east-west trade and other exchanges. Britain has much to contribute to this process, and as Members of the Community we shall be better able to do so. Britain, with her Commonwealth links, has also much to contribute to the universal nature of Europe’s responsibilities. The collective history of the countries represented here encompasses a large part of the history of the world itself over the centuries. I am not thinking today of the Age of Imperialism, now past: but of the lasting and creative effects of the spread of language and of culture, of commerce and of administration by people from Europe across land and sea to the other continents of the world. These are the essential ties which today bind Europe in friendship with the rest of mankind. What design should we seek for the New Europe? It must be a Europe which is strong and confident within itself. A Europe in which we shall be working for the progressive relaxation and elimination of east/west tensions. A Europe conscious of the interests of its friends and partners. A Europe alive to its great responsibilities in the common struggle of humanity for a better life. Thus this ceremony marks an end and a beginning. An end to divisions which have stricken Europe for centuries. A beginning of another stage in the construction of a new and greater Europe. This is the task for our generation in Europe. »

Et, enfin, le quatrième:

1979 Conservative Party General Election Manifesto (beginning)


FOR ME, THE HEART OF POLITICS is not political theory, it is people and how they want to live their lives. No one who has lived in this country during the last five years can fail to be aware of how the balance of our society has been increasingly tilted in favour of the State at the expense of individual freedom. This election may be the last chance we have to reverse that process, to restore the balance of power in favour of the people. It is therefore the most crucial election since the war. Together with the threat to freedom there has been a feeling of helplessness, that we are a once great nation that has somehow fallen behind and that it is too late now to turn things round. I don't accept that. 1 believe we not only can, we must. This manifesto points the way. It contains no magic formula or lavish promises. It is not a recipe for an easy or a perfect life. But it sets out a broad framework for the recovery of our country, based not on dogma, but On reason, on common sense, above all on the liberty of the people under the law. The things we have in common as a nation far outnumber those that set us apart. It is in that spirit that I commend to you this manifesto.

Margaret Thatcher

THIS ELECTION is about the future of Britain - a great country which seems to have lost its way. It is a country rich in natural resources, in coal, oil, gas and fertile farmlands. It is rich, too, in human resources, with professional and managerial skills of the highest calibre, with great industries and firms whose workers can be the equal of any in the world. We are the inheritors of a long tradition of parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. Yet today, this country is faced with its most serious problems since the Second World War. What has happened to our country, to the values we used to share, to the success and prosperity we once took for granted?

During the industrial strife of last winter, confidence, self-respect, common sense, and even our sense of common humanity were shaken. At times this society seemed on the brink of disintegration. Some of the reasons for our difficulties today are complex and go back many years. Others are more simple and more recent. We do not lay all the blame on the Labour Party: but Labour have been in power for most of the last fifteen years and cannot escape the major responsibility. They have made things worse in three ways. First, by practising the politics of envy and by actively discouraging the creation of wealth, they have set one group against another in an often bitter struggle to gain a larger share of a weak economy.

Second, by enlarging the role of the State and diminishing the role of the individual, they have crippled the enterprise and effort on which a prosperous country with improving social services depends.

Third, by heaping privilege without responsibility on the trade unions, Labour have given a minority of extremists the power to abuse individual liberties and to thwart Britain's chances of success. One result is that the trade union movement, which sprang from a deep and genuine fellow-feeling for the brotherhood of man, is today more distrusted and feared than ever before.

It is not just that Labour have governed Britain badly. They have reached a dead-end. The very nature of their Party now prevents them from governing successfully in a free society and mixed economy. Divided against themselves; devoid of any policies except those which have led to and would worsen our present troubles; bound inescapably by ties of history, political dogma and financial dependence to a single powerful interest group, Labour have demonstrated yet again that they cannot speak and dare not act for the nation as a whole. Our country's relative decline is not inevitable. We in the Conservative Party think we can reverse it, not because we think we have all the answers but because we think we have the one answer that matters most. We want to work with the grain of human nature, helping people to help themselves - and others. This is the way to restore that self-reliance and self-confidence which are the basis of personal responsibility and national success.

Attempting to do too much, politicians have failed to do those things which should be done. This has damaged the country and the authority of government. We must concentrate on what should be the priorities for any government. They are set out in this manifesto. Those who look in these pages for lavish promises or detailed commitments on every subject will look in vain. We may be able to do more in the next five years than we indicate here. We believe we can. But the Conservative government's first job will be to rebuild our economy and reunite a divided and disillusioned people.

jeudi 10 septembre 2015

Me contacter

Par courriel: Olivier.Cassagnau@u-bordeaux-montaigne.fr

Mon casier se trouve dans la salle des enseignants de l'UFR de Langues, au premier étage du bâtiment A. Mon bureau est le A311.

vendredi 14 mars 2014

Textes de Version

Vide pour l'instant.

samedi 24 mars 2012

Documents divers

Voici, en pièces jointes ci-dessous, les textes qui ont été étudiés en Contraction-Grammaire au premier semestre l'an dernier et les trois CM de cette année.

vendredi 30 septembre 2011

Ouvrages intéressants Royaume-Uni/Europe

Voici les références de quatre livres en anglais qui peuvent vous servir à enrichir le contenu des CM et des TD. A vous de choisir celui qui vous convient le mieux:






samedi 24 septembre 2011

Informations générales pour la grammaire et la phonétique L1 LLCE

En pièces jointes, vous trouverez la brochure d'exercices de grammaire de Mme Moreau et, pour la phonétique, les documents du cours de Mme Barrett.

lundi 7 mars 2011

Liens divers

Un documentaire sur la préhistoire: http://www.inrap.fr/archeologie-pre...

Un documentaire sur Stonehenge et sur les croyances des Européens à l'Âge du bronze: http://www.amazon.fr/National-Geogr...

Un artiste hongrois de 1989 injustement méconnu en Europe de l'Ouest: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VEy...

mercredi 22 septembre 2010


Bienvenue sur le blog d'Olivier Cassagnau, Maître de Conférences en Civilisation britannique à l'Université Bordeaux Montaigne.